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ABSTRACT 
This paper seeks to make a contribution to on-going debates about how to conceptualise the 
spatial processes of renewable energy transition. It makes a case for understanding renewable 
energy transitions as simultaneously spatial and political processes, constitutive of new 
territories and configuring development pathways. Drawing on a case study of South Africa’s 
Renewable Energy Independent Power Procurement Programme (REI4P), the paper explores 
the ways in which energy transitions are intrinsically bound up with both the materiality and 
the historical and contemporary politics of land. It then examines the relationship between 
energy transitions and territory to conceptualise the ways in which transitions take on an 
experimental shape, deploying forms of spatial and political-administrative exceptionality – 
‘zones’ – that allow political and economic actors to exercise authority and commercial 
power. Two types of zone emerging from South Africa’s energy transition exemplify these 
processes: legally-defined zones for the development of solar and wind energy and zones of 
socio-economic development required by REI4P. The paper explores the spatial and political 
consequences of these strategies and suggests that these may not necessarily translate into 
conflict and confrontation, but instead produce uneasy co-existences of different political, 
social and spatial projects and interests with potential to create new polities. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper seeks to make a contribution to on-going debates about how to conceptualise the 
spatial processes of renewable energy transition. It makes a case for understanding renewable 
energy transitions as simultaneously spatial and political processes, constitutive of new 
territories and configuring development pathways. Drawing on a case study of South Africa’s 
Renewable Energy Independent Power Procurement Programme (REI4P), the paper explores 
the ways in which energy transitions are intrinsically bound up with both the materiality and 
the historical and contemporary politics of land. It then examines the relationship between 
energy transitions and territory to conceptualise the ways in which transitions take on an 
experimental shape in the form of ‘zones’. The paper argues that these zones are new 
territories deploying forms of spatial and political-administrative exceptionality, which allow 
political and economic actors to exercise authority and commercial power. Two types of zone 
emerging from South Africa’s energy transition exemplify these processes: legally-defined 
zones for the development of solar and wind energy and zones of socio-economic 
development required by REI4P. The paper explores the spatial and political consequences of 
these strategies and suggests that these may not necessarily translate into conflict and 
confrontation, but instead produce uneasy co-existences of different political, social and 
spatial projects and interests, with potential to create new polities. 
 
Keywords: Renewable energy, South Africa, zone, territory, land, energy transition 
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Spatial processes and politics of renewable energy transition: land, zones and frictions 
in South Africa 
 
INTRODUCTION 
There is a long and rich history of engagement by geographers with energy (see Calvert 
2015), but until recently, the importance of geographical approaches to understanding 
renewable energy transitions has been largely neglected. As Shove and Walker (2014) argue, 
energy policy, engineering and material science tends to focus on methods for either meeting 
demand more efficiently or for reducing CO2 emissions, while social scientists tend to focus 
on questions about the politics of access, provision and supply. There have been basic 
analyses of some of the geographical dimensions of contemporary energy challenges at 
different scales (global, regional, urban, household); geographers have also used the concept 
of ‘energy landscape’ to analyse how different modes of energy production, distribution and 
use underpin material relations, such as landscape form and livelihoods (Calvert 2015; Nadai 
and van der Horst 2010). However, debates about renewable energy transitions have tended 
to focus on the temporal dimensions of ‘transition’ and to neglect “the way in which spatial 
processes shape energy systems and influence their capacity for transformation” (Bridge et 
al. 2013: 332). Bridge et al. call for interventions that seek to examine the spatial 
organisation and governance of new energy systems, and to generate new ways of thinking 
about energy transition as a spatially-constituted process “involving the reconfiguration of 
current patterns and scales of economic and social activity” (2013: 231). As Huber (2015: 27) 
argues, understanding renewable energy transitions “will also require new spatialities and 
new spatial imaginations.” 
In response, this paper seeks to make a contribution to on-going debates about how to 
conceptualise the spatial processes of renewable energy transition, while also making a case 
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for understanding renewable energy transitions as simultaneously spatial and political 
processes. Timothy Mitchell (2011) has illustrated how the material properties of carbon 
fuels revolutionised first western and then global polities. Due to its bulk and dependency on 
labour to move it, coal gave working-class people and labour unions new power, acting as a 
catalyst for democracy and progress. The fluid properties of oil allowed elites to regain 
control over energy supplies, devise systems through which to maximise profits and reduce 
vulnerability to democratic pressures. Oil also made it possible for the first time in history to 
reorganize political life around the management of ‘the economy’ and the promise of its 
infinite growth. The global ramifications of renewable energy transitions are beyond the 
scope of this paper, but it makes a case for examining the ways in which such transitions are 
already constitutive of new territories and polities in particular locations. Specifically, the 
paper first explores the importance of acknowledging the ways in which energy transitions 
are intrinsically bound up with both the materiality and the historical and contemporary 
politics of land. Second, it develops the notion of energy transitions as a form of territoriality 
(Bridge et al. 2013) to conceptualise the ways in which they take on an experimental shape, 
deploying forms of spatial and political-administrative exceptionality – ‘zones’ – that allow 
political and economic actors to exercise authority and commercial power. Third, it explores 
the unintended spatial and political consequences of these strategies, reflecting on the kinds 
of polities that are emerging and could emerge within these spaces. 
 The paper develops these ideas through an exploration of South Africa’s renewable 
energy transition, which has proposed around 600 renewable energy projects, both grid and 
off-grid and ranging from utility-scale to household-level systems, in the absence of a 
consolidated strategic spatial plan (Cape-Ducluzeau and van der Westhuizen 2015). Yet, as 
this paper argues, spatial processes are shaping the emerging energy transition and their 
consequences are likely to be dramatic. The South African government has recently 
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committed to a strategy for electricity generation until 2030 that makes provision for a 
diverse energy mix. As part of this, in 2011 it launched the Renewable Energy Independent 
Power Producer Procurement Programme (REI4P), a public-private partnership that provides 
impetus to a low-carbon energy transition. This is an ambitious programme that attempts to 
ensure renewable energy capacity is fully developed while mediating the competing powerful 
interests involved and ensuring that some of the profits are retained in South Africa. To date, 
REI4P has procured approximately 5,041 megawatts (MW) of renewable energy in four 
bidding rounds at costs increasingly competitive with coal-fired electricity by mobilising over 
R168 billion (£8.57 billion)
1
 of investment, largely from the private sector (Papapetrou 
2014). South Africa has thus secured more investment for more independent power 
generation than has been achieved across the entire African continent over the past 20 years 
and, since 2012, has ranked among the top ten countries globally in renewable energy 
Independent Power Producer (IPP) investments (Eberhard et al. 2014). The scale remains 
relatively modest when gauged against planned procurement from other energy sources 
(7400MW from new coal-fired, gas-fired and hydro-electricity generation; 9600MW from a 
nuclear-build programme; 15,000MW from the Grand Inga Hydro-electricity Partnership in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo
2
). However, the commitment to sourcing over 40% of 
new electricity generation from renewable sources by 2030 represents a considerable policy 
shift that positions South Africa as a leading player in utility-scale wind and solar power 
generation, and in which the REI4P is a significant driver.  
While it is too early to assess the success of REI4P, this paper examines the ways in 
which it is already remaking territory, creating new polities, and producing new scalar 
relationships within and beyond South Africa. It draws on research conducted between 2012 
and 2014, including six weeks of fieldwork in the Northern and Western Cape provinces. 
Thirty-six interviews were conducted with key informants including: two local government 
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officials and three Community Programme Managers involved in renewable energy in both 
provinces; CEOs in three sustainable energy companies; three independent sustainability 
consultants; twenty-one individual off-grid energy consumers in five different locations in 
both provinces, and; six sustainable development professionals. The paper also draws on 
document analysis of government renewable energy policies, industry and government press 
releases, and other reports on South Africa’s renewable energy roll-out. The first section of 
the paper makes a case for the importance of situating REI4P within histories and politics of 
energy and land, focusing specifically on the simultaneous re-valuing and discursive 
occlusion of land within South African renewable energy policy and debate. The second 
section of the paper uses the concept of ‘the zone’ to examine new territories emerging from 
and shaping the renewable energy transition. The first are zones that have been identified as 
optimal for the location of wind and solar energy projects, and in which business is being 
made easier for international investors in renewable energy. The second are zones for 
development surrounding individual renewable energy projects, which are spatially defined 
by procurement rules and in which IPPs are required to deliver socio-economic benefits to the 
local ‘community’. Drawing on Easterling (2014a: 1-2), the paper argues that these two zones 
are “meta-infrastructures” administered by public and private actors and creating “de facto, 
undeclared forms of polity”. They are spaces in which “extrastatecraft”– activity that is both 
outside of and in addition to statecraft – is performed, and in which state and private sector 
forces have attained “power and administrative authority necessary to undertake the building 
of infrastructure” (ibid.: 2). A critical question in the context of South Africa is whether or 
not these two different zones are also spaces in which a just energy transition (Newell and 
Mulvaney 2013) can occur. Inspired by Tsing’s (2005) notion of “zones of awkward 
engagement”, the paper suggests that within these zones global investors and speculators, 
national and local government discourses of development, and the autonomy and desires of 
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the poorest in society exist together in a state of friction. The paper explores the possibilities 
for the emergence of new polities out of these frictions and reflects on their likely outcomes. 
Finally, it draws some tentative conclusions about the broader significance of understanding 
renewable energy transitions as simultaneously spatial and political processes. 
 
RENEWABLE ENERGY TRANSITION AND THE POLITICS OF LAND 
Approximately 96% of South Africa’s electricity is generated by Eskom, the largest energy 
producer in Africa (Baker et al. 2014); 93% of Eskom’s generation is coal-powered (Tyler et 
al. 2011). South Africa’s minerals-energy complex (Fine and Rustomjee 1996) – a regime of 
accumulation that has its origins in apartheid – continues to exert enormous influence over 
the country’s energy sector (Swilling and Annecke 2012). However, South Africa is 
experiencing an on-going energy crisis, shifting from historic over-capacity fuelled by cheap 
domestic coal for commercial and industrial use under apartheid, to rising demand and falling 
reserves fuelled by economic growth and post-apartheid grid expansion. The crisis has been 
exacerbated by lack of infrastructure investment, fuelled in large part by uncertainty within 
government strategic planning. In the late 1990s, the government drew up plans to partially 
privatise Eskom, including divesting 30% of production capacity, outsourcing functions, 
creating independent regional distributors and fully corporatising Eskom. These plans stalled 
in 2003. As McDonald (2009) argues, some commentators saw this initially as a retreat from 
privatisation, but plans for private sector involvement have remained central to government 
strategy. REI4P is one eventual outcome of this commitment to liberalisation. In the 
meantime, government has been forced to commit to massive infrastructure investment in 
order to meet rising demand, with R385 billion (c. £20 billion) invested in 2013, rising to 
over R1 trillion (c. £51 billion) by 2026 in a planned doubling of capacity. Over the last 
decade, Eskom has been struggling to build an additional 17,000MW of generation capacity 
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by 2018 amidst a funding crisis that has led to maintenance backlogs and delays (Eskom 
2011: 61). Its response has been expensive buyback agreements with industrial users paid not 
to consume electricity, and ‘load-shedding’ (rolling power-cuts) and year-on-year tariff 
increases of 27.5% for domestic consumers. This has been deeply unpopular, stoking 
suspicions of favourable tariffs for corporations (Ngwane 2008) not helped by a widely 
perceived culture of secrecy within Eskom. 
South Africa’s minerals-energy complex is underpinned by an economy that is 
structurally dependent upon energy intensive growth, based on abundant sources of low-cost 
coal and the exploitation of black labour (Baker et al. 2014). While the architecture of South 
Africa’s political economy creates enduring structures of power between the financial sector, 
parastatals, government, and the private sector that underpin the minerals-energy complex, a 
number of factors have made it increasingly unsustainable (ibid.). These include: the 
financialisation of South Africa’s resource conglomerates and liberalisation of capital flows 
resulting in capital flight; the crisis of legitimacy brought about by continued exploitation and 
oppression of black workers; and increasing concerns about the environmental consequences 
of carbon-intensive energy production. Consequently, the last decade has witnessed a gradual 
policy shift towards investment in renewable energy, marked by the 2003 White Paper on 
Renewable Energy (DME 2003), the 2008 Energy Act and the 2010 Integrated Resource Plan 
(DoE 2010a, 2011). At the 2009 Copenhagen climate change summit, President Zuma 
pledged to reduce South Africa’s greenhouse gas emissions by 34% by 2020 and 44% by 
2025 (Baker et al. 2014), focusing attention on utilising the country’s natural assets. South 
Africa has a large area (around 194,000 km
2
, see Figure 1) of high radiation and the Northern 
Cape is one of the best solar resource areas in the world (Edkins et al. 2010). Taking 
advantage of this requires large investments in infrastructure for both electricity production 
and transmission to the main electricity consumer centres (Pegels 2010). In 2011, the revised 
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IRP determined that 42% of new electricity generation capacity would come from renewable 
sources – mainly wind, solar photovoltaics and concentrated solar power,3 with some biomass 
and geothermal generation – by 2030 (IRP 2011). In order to meet investment requirements, 
30% is being procured through the REI4P. The government has thus taken the first step in the 
liberalisation of South Africa’s energy market and promulgated the beginnings of a 
renewable energy transition.  
The drivers of this shift are likely to be significant in determining wider outcomes. 
First, REI4P is a response to the country’s escalating energy crisis since 2008 and an urgent 
need to produce additional generation capacity to the grid. Wind and solar power plants are 
the quickest to build (the government’s enormous investment in coal and nuclear power 
stations will take much longer to come on stream). The second driver is the government’s 
adoption of the post-Rio+20 ‘Green Economy’ agenda, which sees economic development as 
the principal force and outcome of investment in renewable energy, fuelled primarily by 
public and private investments (UNEP 2011; Sukhdev et al. 2010). REI4P signals the 
government’s endorsement of this framework despite criticism that it could produce new 
power relations of inequality and injustice (Death 2014; Clemenceau 2012). The renewable 
energy sector is seen as a key element in a ‘New Growth Path’ aimed at job creation which, 
given that South Africa has one of the world’s highest unemployment rates at 34% (StatSA 
2014), remains a critical issue for government. The third driver is recognition that South 
Africa, as the 12
th
 highest carbon emitter in the world (IEIA 2013; CAIT 2012; Rennkamp 
and Wlokas 2012), needs to diversify its energy mix in order to honour its international 
commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, although REI4P is the outcome 
of considerable political will and desire to promote a sustainable renewable energy industry 
delivering both cost-effective energy and socio-economic benefits (Papapetrou 2014), poverty 
alleviation and inequality are not principal drivers. Yet, as Baker et al. (2014: 793) argue, the 
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government is aware that “the production of energy has to enhance the employment 
prospects” of the unemployed “while also addressing the issue of energy poverty”.  
To date REI4P has awarded 77 projects to the private sector and 20-year Power 
Purchase Agreements are in place between Eskom and IPPs. Round 1, completed in 2011, 
has procured twenty solar parks and eight wind farms that have already started to come on 
stream. Round 2, completed in 2012, has procured ten solar parks, seven wind farms and two 
small hydro projects. Round 3, completed in 2013, has procured eight solar parks, seven wind 
farms, one biomass and one geothermal project. Round 4 was delayed because Eskom was 
unable to provide transmission grid access to the new projects, but was completed in April 
2015, with six solar PV projects, five onshore wind projects, one biomass and one small 
hydro project. As Figure 1 illustrates, a clear geography of REI4P projects has emerged, with 
the majority of the solar projects (including all Round 4 projects) located in the Northern 
Cape and wind projects concentrated in the Western, Eastern and Northern Cape Provinces. 
Northern Cape has 41 projects in total, Eastern Cape 16 and Western Cape 9 (WWF 2015). 
REI4P is lauded as a successful model, for South Africa and internationally (Montmasson-
Clair and Ryan 2014), of a watertight public-private partnership and tendering process that is 
competitive and free from corruption – what has been euphemistically termed 
‘tenderpreneurialism’ (Eberhard et al. 2014: 1). It remains to be seen, however, if REI4P can 
deliver energy in ways that are more economically and socially just than has been the case 
with South Africa’s traditional energy sector. Its spatial processes and outcomes will play an 
important role in determining this; understanding these requires a conceptualisation of 
renewable energy transition that acknowledges historical and contemporary politics of land 
and how they give rise to new forms of territory – political technologies comprising 
“techniques for measuring land and controlling terrain” (Elden 2010: 811).   
[Figure 1 near here] 
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REI4P requires bidders to procure land as sites for development and to submit 
environmental impact assessments, but political discourse concerning REI4P has until 
recently underplayed issues of land ownership and value. The discursive erasure of land 
within public debate about renewable energy is particularly notable given that the South 
African land question is of great political sensitivity and importance, and in which the 
minerals-energy complex is historically embroiled (Freund 2010). The Natives Land Act of 
1913 dispossessed indigenous South Africans of 90% of the nation’s land and helped 
proletarianize a large proportion of the rural population shortly after the discovery of 
minerals, providing a source of cheap labour for extractive industries (Hall and Ntsebeza 
2007). Post-apartheid governments have made land reform, restitution and redistribution a 
priority in order to bring about socio-economic redress, but the pace of change has been 
painfully slow. As Hall and Ntsebeza argue, the land issue is “a complex one that 
encompasses the question of how land is accessed and used… and how capital is 
accumulated” (ibid.: 4). Its role in alleviating structural poverty and job creation is important 
for policy-makers, particularly given the failure of neo-liberal macro-economic policy to 
generate jobs in urban areas. South Africa’s renewable energy transition has particular 
implications for land use and profitability, as well as potential to further politicise land 
ownership. Land capable of providing opportunities for generating renewable energy gains a 
“new source of potential value” (Bridge et al. 2013: 335) and such spaces are currently being 
targeted for commercial development. These include the flat, semi-arid landscapes of the 
Northern Cape, which are preferred sites for solar power, and the coastal and upland areas of 
the Western and Eastern Capes, which are optimal for wind power. In other countries 
experiencing similar energy transitions, the effects on land of renewable energy development 
have “become a key arena in the debate on energy policy” (Nadai and van der Horst 2010: 
143), yet this has not been the case in South Africa. Why this is so is likely down to three 
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factors: the effects of government discourse, REI4P compliancy rules, and the nature of land 
ownership in areas targeted for development. 
The role of government discourse has been particularly notable in the case of the 
development of solar energy in the Northern Cape. An important speech by the then Minister 
of Energy at an Investors Conference in 2010 is revealing for what it does and does not say:  
Diamonds that used to attract people to the Northern Cape have been depleted. We are 
here to see how we can harvest the diamond that is the sun in the sky... We are on the 
cusp of a world-wide green revolution with a plethora of economic opportunities, 
particularly in solar energy, available to our country… and this dry and dusty 
Northern Cape, which is one of the poorest regions in South Africa, will become the 
centre of our response. (DoE 2010b: 12, 15) 
The Minister went on to describe the Northern Cape as having “excellent and consistent sun” 
and “flat and sparcely-populated land”, and she issued a “challenge [to] my colleagues in the 
Northern Cape to make Upington one of the Solar Capitals of the world.” The Northern Cape 
is thus newly constituted as an energy resource at the same time as the government is 
establishing legal and extra-legal mechanisms through which to create resource access 
(Karplus and Meir 2013). The province is discursively constructed as a resource frontier for 
the nascent South African market in renewable energy and its second largest town – 
Upington, with a population of less than 75,000 – as a potential centre of a global energy 
revolution. Tsing (2000: 119) refers to this discourse as globalist “conjuring” and 
“hegemonic world-making”, in which claims are made on a global scale as a means for 
justifying the rendering tangible on a region’s landscape the aspirations of a national elite. 
Government discourse is aimed at wooing potential international investors by creating an 
almost magical vision of a renewable energy landscape that does not yet exist in a dramatic 
performance which, in turn, creates an expectation that is the pre-requisite of economic 
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performance. This discursive territorialisation “does political work” (Bridge et al. 2013: 336) 
in positioning the South African government at the centre of global energy transitions and 
attracting investment, while simultaneously occluding questions about land.  
The South African renewable energy transition illustrates the ways in which sunlight 
and wind are now constituted in wider energy transitions as inert resources for renewable 
energy projects while being mobilised as new means for capital accumulation. The Northern 
Cape has exceptionally high levels of insolation (see Figure 1), but the sun is not a resource 
that can be directly plundered. As with diamond mining, land is the key resource from which 
value can be extracted. However, the ‘diamond in the sky’ discourse creates an image of 
riches being generated from a shared, distant and renewable resource (the sun) and diverts 
attention from the fact that the solar energy production under REI4P is industrial in scale, 
requiring significant swaths of land (Huber 2015). The only hint of this in the Minister’s 
speech is the reference to the Northern Cape being sparsely populated. While this is true (the 
Northern Cape is South Africa’s largest and least populated province with just over one 
million people), most land is either commercially-owned (also the case in the sites for wind 
energy development) or municipally-owned. Most of the REI4P projects are being built on 
commercial farmland (the semi-arid lands of the Northern Cape, for example, are used 
primarily for grazing). IPPs thus need to secure agreements with landowners on transfer of 
ownership or lease rights for REI4P projects; as a consequence of prevailing land ownership 
patterns, these agreements serve the interests of commercial (mainly white) landowners. In 
the Northern Cape, land deemed previously to have low agricultural value escalates in value 
when positioned in the optimal zones for solar energy production (Figure 1). Landowners 
choosing to lease rather than to sell will receive the bulk of the lease payments for renewable 
energy projects, on average about 2% of the total revenues over the 20-year life of the 
project.
4
 Given that these are private transactions, it is virtually impossible to find 
 20 
information on the actual benefit accruing to landowners and it would not be in the 
government’s interest to seek greater transparency (McDaid 2014), but the returns are likely 
to be considerable.  
It is notable that the renewable energy transition has coincided with new legislation 
regarding land rights. In June 2014, the Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Act reopened 
the land claims process that closed in 1998, giving groups and individuals who can prove 
dispossession after 1913 a further five years to lodge claims for restitution or compensation. 
By March 2016, 143,720 new claims had been lodged. The Northern Cape has seen most 
claims settled for land restitution to rural communities and families, often involving “tension 
between mining and agriculture and the best sustainable land use in the province” 
(Government of RSA 2016). Significantly for REI4P, renewable energy developers will now 
need to include potential local land claims in project risk profiles. The Act at least opens the 
possibilities for the dispossessed to stake a claim for land restitution and/or a share of the 
lease payments accruing from REI4P. One successful case concerns the Tsitsikamma 
Community Wind Farm near Wittekleibosch in the Eastern Cape, built on land where 
amaFengu people were forcibly removed under apartheid in the 1970s. The community 
returned to the land after a claim was lodged in 1994 and is now a 9% shareholder of the 
wind farm (Forder 2015). However, legislation does not help those dispossessed prior to 1913 
and, in these cases, REI4P could heighten perceptions of injustice. For example, four 
neighbouring communities in uMkuze in KwaZulu-Natal recently brought a claim against 
Charl Senekal, South Africa’s largest sugar farmer and KwaZulu-Natal’s largest private 
landowner, whose bid to build a R1.1 billion, 16.5 MW biomass plant was approved in 
Round 3 (Potelwa 2015). Whilst the claim has delayed development, it may not be successful 
because Senekal has counter-claimed that the land has been occupied by whites since 1880.  
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These cases are important because they counter the reduction of energy landscapes to 
inert resource frontiers and reassert the ways in which they are simultaneously natural, social 
and active (Tsing 2005: 29). While land is unlikely to give dispossessed people power similar 
to that given by coal to working-class people (Mitchell 2011), its material properties as a 
resource fixed in situ also gives rise to very particular forms of territorialisation and struggle 
(Li 2014). Land rights legislation and claims involving REI4P projects illustrate that 
historical land injustices cannot be erased from South Africa’s energy transition. The 2014 
Act creates opportunities for some dispossessed groups to stake a claim for a share of 
landowner profits from the REI4P process. However, the government is equally concerned 
with demonstrating to overseas investors that there is political will at the highest level to 
improve the efficiency of doing business in South Africa in order to counter investor fears of 
being bogged down by land claims. The following discussion examines how it is doing this 
through the spatial technology of ‘the zone’. 
 
SPATIAL POLITICS AND RENEWABLE ENERGY ZONES 
The idea of ‘the zone’ provides an important means of conceptualising the spatial politics of 
renewable energy transitions and their consequences. Reflecting on globalisation, Aihwa Ong 
(2006: 91-2) critiques its structural logic, which she argues “create[s] a galaxy of 
differentiated zones [technology zones, growth triangles] unevenly integrated into the 
structures of state power and global capital”. This logic reconfigures national space and 
results in the “proliferation of differentiated sovereignty within and across borders” (ibid.); it 
shatters meta-geographical demarcations such as ‘Developed’ and ‘Third World’, which have 
“re-converged around enclaves” (Sidaway 2007: 336). Keller Easterling (2014a: 1-2) also 
argues that ‘the zone’ – “the Free Trade Zone… or any of the dozens of variants” – is a 
powerful global form, but focuses specifically on the ways in which space has become 
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infrastructural, which I suggest has deeper significance for understanding the spatial and 
political outcomes of energy transitions. According to Easterling (ibid.), the free zone is 
“meta-infrastructure” administered by public and private cohorts. Free zones are necessitated 
by large-scale infrastructure projects, which create a need for an administrative authority 
comparable to that of the state, but requiring direction from new constellations of 
international, inter-governmental, and non-governmental actors. They are thus sites of 
multiple, overlapping or nested forms of sovereignty, where domestic and transnational 
jurisdictions collide. Easterling (ibid.)defines these forms of sovereignty as “extrastatecraft”, 
operating “both outside of and in addition to statecraft” and in which “multiple forces – state, 
non-state, military, market, non-market – have now attained the considerable power and 
administrative authority necessary to undertake the building of infrastructure”, far removed 
from familiar legislative processes. Extrastatecraft thus describes how power is increasingly 
exercised not through the language of law and diplomacy, but through spatial, infrastructural 
technologies. The following discussion draws on the concepts of the zone and extrastatecraft 
to explore the ways in which renewable energy transitions take on an experimental shape, 
deploying forms of spatial and political-administrative exceptionality, which in South Africa 
are generating very specific political and developmental outcomes. 
Easterling (2014a, 1) argues that free zones are generating “de facto, undeclared 
forms of polity” within powerful globally networked systems. Importantly, she suggests that 
while binary resistance might seem powerless and irrelevant in infrastructure space, activists 
are also able to engage in extrastatecraft and, through understanding how infrastructure space 
works, they can relieve and challenge oppression. This idea that political gains can be made 
is also significant in conceptualising the spatial politics of renewable transitions. The free 
zone is intended to create a frictionless realm of legal and economic exemptions. However, as 
discussed below, it often generates other frictions; as Tsing (2005) argues, like rubbing two 
 23 
sticks together these frictions produce movement, action, effect. The free zone can thus be 
conceptualised as a “zone of awkward engagement” (ibid.: xi) in which different competing 
political, social and spatial interests co-exist uneasily, but not necessarily in confrontation or 
conflict. Spatial planning for renewable energy development claims to be based on objective 
research, but the process by which specific areas are classified as acceptable locations for 
development is profoundly political, shaped by power imbalances in the political-economy 
and often resulting in environmental injustices (Cowell 2010). In South Africa, spatial 
planning related to REI4P is creating different kinds of zones for development that also have 
the potential to generate injustices. However, I suggest that as zones of friction and ‘awkward 
engagement’ they also create possibilities for new, progressive polities through which 
injustices may be countered. 
 
REDZs: Renewable Energy Meta-Infrastructure 
Under REI4P rules, a bid can be submitted only once the Environmental Authorisation is in 
hand, land rights have been secured, and the bidder can provide evidence of a notarial lease 
registration and proof of land use applications (DoE 2015). Some cases have required 
upwards of twenty permissions, taking over a year to be processed, and the Department of 
Environmental Affairs has been inundated with and overwhelmed by renewable energy 
projects seeking approvals. In response, the government aims to speed up the process by 
creating zones where doing business will be easier and quicker for developers, specifically in 
meeting the criteria for compliance. In accordance with the National Infrastructure Plan (NPC 
2012), Renewable Energy has been included as part of the Strategic Infrastructure Project for 
energy, known as SIP8.
5
 A Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA), led by the Council 
for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), has been initiated under SIP8 to identify 
Renewable Energy Development Zones (REDZs) – geographical areas most suitable for the 
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rollout of wind and solar energy projects and the supporting electricity grid network. The 
process will also provide a platform for coordination between the various government 
departments that have a mandate for issuing environmental authorizations or consents to 
allow for a more streamlined authorization process. It is intended that through the SEA 
process all participating government departments will be able to pre-assess the requirements 
for which they have a mandate and to either issue general authorizations and exemptions or 
de-list energy applications.
6
 
 The SEA constitutes the first attempt at proactive spatial planning for wind and solar 
energy development in South Africa. REDZs are zones in which large-scale renewable 
energy development would be considered most appropriate based on environmental, social 
and economic factors. Their mapping begins with wind and solar raw resource data in order 
to identify areas of highest economic potential, and eliminates areas of environmental and 
technical constraint, including protected and environmentally sensitive areas and agricultural 
areas. Consultation with provincial governments, the private sector and members of the 
public then narrow down these areas, although precisely who has been consulted and on what 
basis is unclear (discussed below). More detailed scoping assessments have been undertaken 
in the identified areas for agriculture, landscape, heritage, biodiversity, socio-economic 
sensitivities and other sensitivities, such as aviation, defence, mining, noise. The outcome is 
eight proposed REDZs that purport to protect South Africa’s natural and social resources 
while enabling SIP8 targets to be met more efficiently. The intention is for these to align with 
the SEA corridors for electricity grid infrastructure expansion that is being designed to meet 
energy transmission requirements up to 2040 (Figure 2). The process of approving REDZs by 
government for the rollout of wind and solar in the Cape provinces was finalised in February 
2016. These preferred zones now allow for renewable energy projects and the associated grid 
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infrastructure to be developed without environmental authorization, subject to certain 
conditions, such as adherence to development protocols.  
[Figure 2 near here] 
 REDZs are spaces of extrastatecraft in that they operate in similar ways to free trade 
zones, constituting a legal and economic instrument designed to provide exemptions to 
renewable energy investors and developers, to incentivise growth in the low-carbon 
economy, and to facilitate private-sector development of energy infrastructure. While they 
are unlikely to exhibit the most extreme forms of zone law – unlike some free trade zones, 
REDZs are subject to civil law and government control – they create territories in which 
private, corporatized bodies are able to exert power and influence in their own interests. 
Some players in the renewable energy sector appear to want REDZs to operate more like free 
trade zones, with greater licence for extrastatecraft. For example, the CEO of the South 
African Wind Energy Association (SAWEA), a not-for-profit organisation representing the 
wind industry whose mission is the removal of obstacles to sustainable wind energy industry 
in Southern Africa, believes that the zoning is too spatially restrictive and recommends the 
removal of the requirement for additional local level authorisations.
7
 However, critics are 
concerned about the extent to which all stakeholders have been consulted in the identification 
of REDZs. While the CSIR claims that it has engaged with affected communities,
8
 a recent 
study has found that not a single person interviewed in these communities has heard of the 
strategic environmental assessments (McDaid 2014). There is also a considerable threat of 
land grab occurring within REDZs, particularly if potential investors believe there are too few 
and the overall availability of land is too small. Land values are highly likely to increase 
within REDZs, raising the potential for the possibility of corrupt and anti-competitive 
practices. 
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 Although there is very little public debate about potential land grab in relation to 
REI4P, the spectre of South Africa’s land question becoming a lightning rod for protest may 
have prompted pre-emptive legislation that counters the discursive erasure in government 
rhetoric. The President’s State of the Nation Address in February 2015 indicated that a 
Regulation of Land Holdings Bill, likely to become law in 2016, would be submitted to 
Parliament.
9
 This will prohibit foreigners, including legal entities whose dominant 
shareholder or controller is a foreign-controlled enterprise or interest, from owning land 
(specified as agricultural rather than residential) in South Africa. They would instead be 
eligible only to lease land for periods of between 30 to 50 years. This has the potential to 
have widespread effects on the country’s mining, energy and agricultural sectors, as well as 
on REI4P. Successful IPP bidders, almost all of which have a dominant or controlling foreign 
shareholder, have had the option to secure land rights through either land acquisition or a 
registered long-term lease. To date REI4P developers have demonstrated a preference for 
leasehold structures, but REDZs makes the acquisition of land and land speculation more 
attractive. The proposed Bill will thus provide important protection against land grabs within 
REDZs.  
 
Beneficiary ‘Community’ Zones: Development Meta-Infrastructure  
The REI4P stipulates that communities within a 50km radius of projects must benefit from 
socio-economic development, creating a second type of zone and forming the “meta-
infrastructure” through which extrastatecraft is practised (Easterling 2014a: 2). Two specific 
criteria pertain to local development within these zones; firstly, ‘communities’ are entitled to 
own 2.5-5% of the project shareholding; secondly, the private sector is required to contribute 
1-1.5% of project revenues over the duration of the project to local socio-economic 
development through initiatives that promote access to the economy by black people, 
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including health, education, service delivery, arts and sports programmes (Wlokas et al. 
2012). This is arguably a laudable attempt by the South African government to leverage local, 
primarily rural, economic development out of REI4P and might also be seen as off-setting the 
higher price tariffs that have resulted from early procurement rounds. However, as critics 
have pointed out (see McEwan et al. forthcoming; Baker and Wlokas 2014; Tait et al. 2013; 
Wlokas et al. 2012), these development zones present a number of problems.  
First, what constitutes ‘community’ is not defined, but treated as an arbitrary 
geographically delimited object for development intervention. In many cases, the 50km zone 
in effect comes to define ‘the community’. Second, the zone is a homogenised spatial entity 
that occludes difference within its boundaries. The areas surrounding renewable energy 
projects are likely to incorporate several social groupings, in separate locales and speaking 
different languages, with little cohesion, unity or common identity. They may also cross 
municipal, provincial and/or national boundaries. Failing to account for such diversity is 
potentially problematic in the context of South Africa. Third, the 50km radius produces 
overlapping beneficiary areas, raising questions about who has responsibility for community 
development in these zones and how development plans are being formulated. For example, 
De Aar, a town of less than 50,000 people in an area of the Northern Cape with limited 
economic development opportunities is within 50km of eight renewable energy projects 
likely to deliver considerable revenues
10
 (Baker and Wlokas 2014). Similarly, Upington is 
within the zones of seven projects, and even much smaller towns, such as Loeriesfontein and 
Pofadder (both with populations approximating 3000), are surrounded by projects.  
Developers have not been required to make their socio-economic development plans public 
and they have no desire to share them with other corporations given the competitive bid 
process (McDaid 2014). This has potential to cause great confusion within zones in which 
more than one private sector company is overseeing community development. Fourth, there is 
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inconsistency between IPPs in how they are working with ‘communities’ inside the 50km 
zones. Where the zone incorporates multiple communities, some IPPs have included all, but 
in other zones IPPs have chosen to work with just one ‘community’. This inconsistency has 
the potential to create inequities and to fuel division and conflict between communities within 
and between zones. There is also confusion where the 50km limit includes large metropolitan 
areas, such as Port Elizabeth and Jeffries Bay in the Eastern Cape. In these cases, many IPPs 
are ignoring urban and peri-urban communities in favour of smaller, more easily defined, and 
often more rural communities. It seems that the ‘village-as-community’ is far more easily 
managed as a space for extrastatecraft than complex municipal urban spaces. Fifth, the 50km 
zones create artificial boundaries, often dividing municipal areas, towns or villages, which 
heighten the risk of perceived injustice for those excluded. Finally, some 50km zones are 
very sparsely populated, creating difficulties for IPPs in meeting investment requirements. 
For example, the Industrial Development Corporation that is financing the enormous 100MW 
Xina Solar One project near Pofadder has applied to the Department of Energy to extend the 
50km zone because “the area around the project is... [too] sparsely populated” (IDC 2014). 
As with REDZs, beneficiary community zones are spaces of extrastatescraft because 
they enable private sector actors to take on responsibility for assessing local need, 
determining development outcomes and building infrastructure. Also as with REDZs, 
industry bodies would like greater licence for extrastatecraft in these zones; SAWEA, for 
example, has complained that the socio-economic requirements are too high (Creamer 2011). 
Early evidence suggests that community engagement has been poor throughout the bidding 
process and early stages of project development (Tait et al. 2013), relying entirely on a 
passive beneficiary model, which has not enabled the formation of positive relationships 
between developers and communities. Since community development plans have not been 
made public, the REI4P process has: 
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remained totally non-transparent and can be regarded as structurally flawed as local 
communities cannot participate in planning their own local development without 
access to vital information about the project proposed for their area. (McDaid 2014: 
21) 
Responsibility for informing communities about development requirements lies with the 
project developer because “the detailed requirements in the bid documents and related 
guidance notes have never been disclosed to the public” (Eberhard et al. 2014: 29). However, 
McDaid’s (2014) preliminary survey reveals that very few people within the 50km zones 
understand or are even aware of the potential benefits that should accrue to them. While 
participatory planning and community development is known to be fraught with difficulties 
(Cooke and Kothari 2001), experience in South Africa and elsewhere suggests that top-down 
project implementation is unlikely to solve local problems and can lead to conflict 
(Tshikululu 2010), yet private investors and developers have not undertaken participatory 
community needs assessments and development planning.  
Within these zones of extrastatescraft, the private sector is neither expected nor 
required to relate to existing governance institutions in determining local development needs. 
This is significant because the roles and responsibilities for local government differ from 
project to project and further complications emerge from overlapping beneficiary areas. 
Developers are not required to align with local and national development goals and priorities, 
and the private sector retains overall control over how socio-economic development revenues 
are spent. There is no regional oversight of projects to ensure efficient spending and there are 
no mechanisms to improve community engagement and representation. Moreover, there is 
little accountability on the part of IPPs. After bid approval projects are often sold, making it 
difficult to identify who is responsible for which part of the project (WWF 2015); the only 
legislative requirement is that appropriate sums of money are spent once the project begins to 
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generate revenues. As with corporate community development in the energy sector elsewhere 
in the global South (see, for example, Banks et al. 2013; Frynas 2005; Gardner et al. 2012), 
evidence suggests that developers focus initially on high profile smaller projects to build 
‘brand image’ and promote acceptance. However, this risks “neglecting strategies to unlock 
the longer-term economic potential of local areas” (Tait et al 2013: 21), which might include 
gender and youth empowerment, and results in a lack of alignment between development 
projects and priorities of local stakeholders.  
 In terms of meeting South Africa’s developmental needs, prior research has already 
revealed numerous problems with community development requirements (Baker and Wlokas 
2014; Eberhard et al. 2014; Tait et al. 2013; Wlokas et al. 2012; Wlokas and Tait 2012). 
Targeting spending at extremely localized levels may be inappropriate or inefficient because 
it cannot be done equitably by region or nationally, nor can it be directed at areas in greatest 
need. Projects are clustered around optimal resources and where land is available. As 
discussed, many are in the sparsely populated Northern Cape, while more densely populated 
and impoverished eastern and north-eastern provinces have relatively few projects; this 
pattern is reinforced by the fact that there are no REDZs in KwaZulu-Natal or Mpumalanga. 
Thus, as with extractive industries that have created ‘islands of development’ around 
corporate sites in a larger sea of underdevelopment (Kapelus 2002: 292), the territorialisation 
of South Africa’s low-carbon energy transition is likely to “generate new patterns of uneven 
development” (Bridge et al. 2013: 337). Moreover, the outcomes within ‘islands of 
development’ are not always straightforwardly positive and there is already evidence of 
unintended negative consequences. For example, McDaid (2014: 43) has found an increase in 
the number of gender-based violence cases in one project area, caused by rapid influx of 
single male migrants and a sudden increase in local employment, with an associated rise in 
alcohol and drug use. There has been a sudden rise in teenage pregnancies, single mothers, 
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and increased risk of HIV/AIDS infection rates in project beneficiary zones. Evidence is also 
emerging that rents and food costs have risen rapidly (often by a factor of three) in towns 
close to projects (ibid.). This is clearly beneficial for property owners, but makes life 
increasingly difficult for those too poor to buy their own houses or dependent on the 
availability of affordable rental accommodation. Whether or not REI4P will be successful in 
creating spaces in which a just energy transition can occur requires further investigation as 
projects begin to generate revenues. However, the record of energy companies in corporate 
community development in South Africa and elsewhere in the global South is not generally 
positive (Kapelus 2000; Farrell et al. 2012). There is little to suggest that the zonal 
technologies of REI4P will break the mould.  
 
‘Zones of Awkward Engagement’? 
Spaces of renewable energy in South Africa are bounded zones in localities and 
simultaneously globalised zones of capital, competition and speculation. They thus have 
potential to create friction. Most early analyses of REI4P view these frictions in largely 
negative terms. Baker and Wlokas (2014), for example, point out that REI4P has prevented 
many national firms from entering into and/or retaining a share in the market. This has been a 
feature particularly of Rounds 3 and 4 because smaller national players have been unable to 
compete with the low tariffs offered by foreign companies. One of the reasons for this is that, 
as Baker (2015: 152) argues, the most recent REI4P rounds have seen “a surge of corporate 
financed projects”, with international investors taking more risks for lower returns “because 
of their track record and experience, their access to capital and the likelihood that they have 
preferential pricing agreements with equipment manufacturers” (ibid.: 153).  
The market has certainly become increasingly dominated by big foreign energy and 
project-development corporations. For example, the Italian giant ENEL secured more than 
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one third of projects in Round 3 (two wind and four solar projects) and a further three wind 
projects in Round 4 (DoE 2015). It now controls 938MW of wind and solar power in South 
Africa. Norwegian company Scatec controls 6 solar projects generating 448MW. Other big 
players are Ireland’s Mainstream Renewable Power and China Longyuan Power, and it 
appears that the ownership of the programme is increasingly becoming the domain of equity 
investors and foreign utilities (Baker 2015). Evidence is also emerging to suggest that, 
following global trends in project finance, project developers are selling on their equity to 
larger players, which will result in the extraction of capital from South Africa, as has been 
witnessed in other parts of the economy (Ashman et al. 2011). Ownership of firms is likely to 
rest “increasingly with financial investors as shareholdings become tradable financial assets” 
(Baker 2015: 148). This distances them from their original productive asset, places emphasis 
on maximising return on equity as the key objective, and puts the focus on short-term 
financial gain and extraction of rents rather than long-term sustainability.  
Due to increased competition and falling international prices of capital equipment, 
price tariffs are falling for South African consumers (solar PV tariffs fell by 68% in Round 3 
compared to Round 1, and for wind by 42% (Eberhard et al. 2014; DoE 2013b) and both fell 
again in Round 4), but this money is increasingly likely to leave the country. This is 
generating fears that REI4P is increasingly unsustainable in financial terms and national 
economic benefits. There is a contradiction between, on the one hand, the commercial desires 
for maximisation of shareholder value and short-term capital gains and, on the other hand, the 
government’s desire to retain a proportion of capital gains through the progressive 
requirements for community ownership and economic development (Baker 2015). The 
government may have intended to create a programme with national interests at its core, but it 
may prove difficult to “protect economic and social benefits… in the face of international 
capital” (ibid.: 155). Significantly, however, while international speculators are attracted to 
 33 
invest in REDZs, REI4P ensures that their aspirations are realized only when mediated 
through government and local discourses of development, including a minimal level of local 
community ownership. REDZs are thus ‘zone[s] of awkward engagement’ in which frictions, 
tensions and contradictions are being played out. As Tsing (2005) suggests, these frictions 
need not automatically translate as negative for local communities. There are possibilities for 
stakeholders in beneficiary communities to form new polities and engage in extrastatecraft 
through which to hold both private sector and state interests to account for what is being 
promised by REI4P. The shape and nature of these polities depends on both the nature of the 
community development enacted by investors and the nature of local activism. As Easterling 
(2014b) argues, the key to positive outcomes lies in local communities understanding how 
these new infrastructure spaces work and being able to engage in extrastatecraft in ways that 
counter potential injustice. 
The possibility of conflict between corporate and community stakeholders is more 
likely if REI4P appears to be protecting the interests of global capital rather than resolving 
“energy apartheid” (Corbyn 2010), and there has been a notable silence concerning the role 
of REI4P in the latter. There are two aspects to energy apartheid in South Africa. First is the 
divide between those who can afford to pay for electricity and those who cannot. Energy 
poverty is a considerable problem: on average, households spend 14% of their total monthly 
household income on energy needs, which is higher than the international benchmark of 10% 
for energy poverty. Close to half of all South African households and almost three quarters 
(72%) of those in the poorest quintile are energy poor (DoE 2013a). This has led to 
widespread disconnection, in spite of the introduction of ‘life-line tariffs’ (McDonald 2009: 
xviii).While each bidding round of REI4P has seen reductions in price tariffs (Eberhard 
2013), the Round 4 Northern Cape projects can only be connected when grid capacity has 
been increased by 2018. Given that tariffs are fixed in the REI4P bidding process and capital 
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costs are likely to continue to fall, this could be a form of arbitrage with initially cheaper 
tariffs becoming unfavourable to consumers. 
The second aspect of energy apartheid is the divide between those who have access to 
grid electricity and those who do not. REI4P is concerned with electricity generation and is 
not intended to respond to the needs of those 12 million South Africans who do not have 
access to grid electricity. Consequently, zones of friction are emerging in which communities 
adjacent to renewable energy projects are becoming intricately connected with global 
processes, but remain (literally) disconnected from their benefits. Many of the wind farms are 
located on the Eastern Cape coast, close to some of the densest concentrations of people 
without access to electricity, despite their relative proximity to the grid. Most of the solar 
projects are located in the Northern Cape, which has the least dense medium voltage grid 
network in the country and vast areas with no grid electricity (GSEP 2004). Significantly, 
inadequate energy provision has been identified as a key community need in many rural 
areas.
11
 Frictions are likely to emerge from the expectations created in remote rural areas, in 
which the South African government has failed deliver grid electricity, by the appearance of 
utility-scale renewable energy plants.  
Such frictions may enable local communities to put pressure on renewable energy 
developers to respond to energy poverty as part of their community development 
commitments. However, even if community needs are factored into community development 
plans, without grid roll-out developers are likely to experiment with distributed generation 
(e.g. mini-grid) solutions, with which there is already local dissatisfaction. For example, in 
2012, the Northern Cape provincial government invested R1 million in a household-level 
solar PV pilot project in the small informal settlement of Boomplaas, near Keimoes. 
Interviews with the 16 households suggest that the project has brought some benefits to most, 
including the provision of lighting and the ability to charge cell-phones. However, some 
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systems have already failed or work only intermittently
12
 and all community members are 
disappointed by the system’s low capacity, having been led to believe that it would possess 
similar functionality to grid power. Current usage patterns, especially poor management of 
batteries, which result from ineffective training of users and technical weaknesses in project 
design, are compromising system longevity. Due to the relatively low power capacity, 
people’s needs – principally the ability to cook and use a refrigerator, which they see as 
making most difference to their quality of life – are not being met. No mechanism has been 
put in place to provide the required on-going maintenance and engineering support. 
Furthermore, divisions within households and the community are being created with 
householders suspicious as to why some people’s systems work better than their own. Unless 
properly resourced, it seems that mini-grid systems as energy solutions for rural communities 
are unlikely to resolve tensions. 
The outcome of friction between global energy corporations and local people with 
whom they are being forced to engage remains to be seen, but as Tsing (2005) demonstrates 
in the context of Indonesia, similar frictions in similar zones of awkward engagement have 
altered dramatically, and not often positively, the lives of poorer and weaker parts of society. 
In the context of a just energy transition in South Africa, it will be important for REI4P to 
avoid creating outcomes like those in extractive industries, where similar social processes and 
profound transformations have opened ‘social risks’ to the industrial operation, which have 
then required corporations to direct resources towards highly conservative forms of 
community development (Banks et al. 2013) – support for law and order, forms of social 
technology and paternalistic forms of trusteeship – that remain wilfully detached from 
political processes within communities. However, while Easterling’s (2014b) faith in the 
possibilities of progressive new polities emerging in free zones may be idealistic, the 
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requirements of REI4P at least ensure that developers engage in community development, 
which could potentially open up spaces in renewable energy zones for these new polities. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has sought to examine some of the ways in which processes of renewable energy 
transition are inherently spatial and political. The South African case illustrates how 
renewable energy transitions are intrinsically bound up with historical and contemporary 
politics of land, creating new territories. Within these territories, renewable energy transitions 
take on an experimental shape, deploying forms of spatial and political-administrative 
exceptionality – zones – that allow political and economic actors to exercise authority and 
commercial power. These new spatialities also set in motion power dynamics, creating zones 
in which different political, social and spatial projects and interests are forced into uneasy co-
existence. These new spatialities and the frictions they bring could entrench existing 
inequalities, generating conflict and confrontation. However, drawing on Tsing (2005) and 
Easterling (2014b), this paper suggests that they also have potential to create new polities in 
which diverse actors – including those most politically and socio-economically marginalised 
– are able to stake their claims. 
South Africa’s renewable energy transition is notable for the tensions between 
government and investor rhetoric on the one hand, which seeks to discursively erase land, and 
the nature of renewable energy transitions on the other hand, which re-centre land as the key 
resource and ensure that it is re-valued and re-politicised. A feature of renewable energy 
transitions is that they “require huge amounts of space and territory to generate the energy 
that with fossil fuels is simply extracted from a ‘hole’” (Huber 2015: 36). Concerns about the 
possibilities of land grab by global investors, in a context in which historical and 
contemporary land injustices remain a lightning-rod for political unrest, has led the South 
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African government to balance attracting foreign investment with legislation limiting foreign 
ownership of land. It has also re-opened legal avenues for land restitution that could 
complicate the REI4P process by allowing some dispossessed peoples to claim either 
compensation or a share of landowner dividends. 
New forms of territory through zoning are emerging from South Africa’s renewable 
energy transition. These include REDZs – identified as optimal zones for the location of wind 
and solar energy projects that to some extent mimic free trade zones in making business 
easier for international investors. They also include beneficiary zones drawn around each 
renewable energy project in which private sector actors are charged with defining 
‘community’ and delivering development, an area in which they lack experience and 
expertise and have no demonstrable record of competence. This paper has suggested that both 
zones are types of ‘meta-infrastructure’ creating spaces of ‘extrastatescraft’ (Easterling 
2014b) in which public and private actors have attained the power and administrative 
authority necessary to build energy and development infrastructure, and to determine 
development pathways. These infrastructure spaces have been lubricated by the government’s 
shift towards liberalisation and privatization, and their nature and likely outcomes give some 
cause for concern. The level of engagement with people who will be directly affected within 
these zones is questionable, the ways in which they channel further significant benefits 
towards land-owners and private, corporatized interests remains unproblematized, and REI4P 
remains detached from the wider politics of South Africa’s energy apartheid. The stories 
being foregrounded – for example, that beneficiary zones will deliver considerable 
community development – may serve to disguise or distract from the enormous profits likely 
to be made by both global corporations and South Africa’s elites. However, understanding 
these spaces as “zones of awkward engagement” (Tsing 2005: ix) allows for the possibility of 
progressive outcomes to emerge from the frictions between global investors and speculators, 
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national and local government discourses of development, and the autonomy and desires of 
the poorest and weakest in society.  
 This paper has demonstrated that renewable energy transitions are spatially-
constituted and political processes, rather than processes simply affecting places. This has 
significant implications for policy, not least because, as Bridge et al. (2013: 339) argue, 
“spatial difference and the fundamentally uneven nature of spatial interactions are both 
potentially disruptive to policy because they complicate many of its assumptions”. In the case 
of REI4P, the government aims to bolster electricity supply to the grid through renewable 
resources, while ensuring that local communities benefit from socio-economic development, 
and understanding the ways in which spatial interactions and interrelations are enabling or 
frustrating these policy goals will continue to be important as REI4P becomes further 
embedded. More broadly, South Africa’s renewable energy transition illustrates the ways in 
which spatial and political processes matter in making sense of energy transformations 
(Pasqualetti 2011; Calvert 2015). Renewable energy transitions produce spatial outcomes and 
create new territories that are also deeply politicised and policy-relevant. While these 
outcomes are clearly context-specific, similar spatial processes are shaping and emerging 
from renewable energy transitions around the world. That these remain largely unexamined 
suggests that political geography has much to offer in re-engaging with energy, not simply as 
a resource in the traditional sense, but as potentially constitutive of new spatial patterns and 
processes, new polities and new development pathways. 
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1
 Currency conversions are based on July 2015 rates. The Rand has fallen steadily against 
major global currencies since 2011, when £168 billion would have equated to £14 billion. 
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2
 These figures were confirmed in the 2015 State of the Nation Address (see 
http://www.gov.za/president-jacob-zuma-state-nation-address-2015, accessed 12/6/15). 
3
 Solar energy has greatest renewable resource potential in South Africa. It produces 
electricity either through concentrating solar power, which uses mirrors to concentrate the 
sun’s thermal energy and heat a transfer fluid to produce steam and drive turbines, or through 
solar photovoltaics, which uses primarily silicon panels to convert solar radiation directly into 
electricity (Pegels 2010). 
4
 http://www.climatejobs.org.za/index.php/articles/89-renewable-energy/154-renewable-
energy-for-communities-or-for-the-big-corporates (accessed 12/12/14). 
5
 http://www.gov.za/issues/national-infrastructure-plan (accessed 15/06/15). 
6
 http://www.sawea.org.za/ceo-blog/79-environmental-authorisations.html (accessed 
15/06/15). 
7
 http://www.sawea.org.za/ceo-blog/79-environmental-authorisations.html.  
8
 http://www.infrastructurene.ws/2014/06/05/strategic-search-for-best-renewable-energy-
development-zones/ June 19 2015 
9
 http://www.gov.za/president-jacob-zuma-state-nation-address-2015  
10
 As McDaid (2014) points out, specific numbers for particular projects are not available as 
this information is not in the public domain. However, the figure for one project mentioned in 
her study is R84 million, while according to the Department of Energy, the average value of 
adjusted socio-economic development contribution per MW would be R1,769,475. 
11
 Community and Household Options in Choosing Energy Services (CHOICES) project 
2012-13: 
http://www.oneworldgroup.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1258:ac
cess-to-clean-energy-for-improved-rural-livelihoods&catid=207:low-carbon-development 
12
 Interviews were conducted between 22/02/13 and 28/02/13. 
